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With the increase in the carrying capacity of passenger vessels parallel to technological 
developments over the last 25 years, accidents resulting in loss of lives have increased. Thus, 
accidents involving passenger vessels have become a major issue of concern in the maritime 
industry. In this study, 70 ship collision & contact accidents involving passenger vessels 
between 1991 and 2015 were examined. Unlike other studies in the literature, this investigation 
proposes a customized Human Factors Analysis and Classification System for Passenger Vessel 
Accidents (HFACS-PV) to facilitate analysing the human factor in passenger vessel accidents. 
In addition to the core HFACS structure, an additional environment level has been defined. The 
violations framework has been divided into the three sub-categories of rule violations, 
procedure violations, and abuse of authority, instead of the two broad categories of routine and 
exceptional violations. Abuse of authority is an intentional violation made knowingly and 
wilfully, therefore, abuse of authority has been considered separately. Furthermore, minor 
modifications have been made to the headings under the second level of HFACS-Preconditions 
for Unsafe Acts for compliance with the maritime industry.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
An accident can be defined as pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage to a person, an object, 
or the environment resulting from an unintended or unexpected incident (Harrald et al., 1998; 
Abbot and Renwick, 1999; Etman and Halawa, 2007; Grabowski et al., 2010; Kristiansen, 
2013). Maritime accidents - accidents that occur at sea - are defined as undesired incidents 
resulting in death, injury, loss of vessel, damage to vessel or cargo, damage to equipment, or 
environmental damage (IMO, 2008).  
The designs of passenger vessels have changed significantly since the 1990s. The 
capacities of passenger ships have increased from 500 to 6,000 persons to improve 
transportation efficiency and maximize profit by decreasing the unit cost of transportation 
(FCCA, 2014). However, this has led to increased risks: an accident often involving a passenger 
vessel could now have much more devastating consequences. Thus, accidents involving 
passenger vessels have become a major issue of concern in the maritime industry. While there 
are numerous accident analyses regarding cargo ships in the literature, the number of accident 
analyses and safety assessment studies regarding passenger vessels remains low (Lois et al., 
2004; Kim et al., 2005; Antao and Soares, 2006; Dimitris and Dracos, 2008). The main reason 
for this is that passenger ship accidents are much less frequent than cargo ship accidents. 
Passenger ships represent only 8% of the world commercial fleet (Equasis, 2015). The concept 
of safety on passenger ships has always been at a higher level than cargo ships (IMO 1974). 
Hence many researchers focus on cargo vessel accidents and they are more frequent that 
passenger vessel accidents. 
Today, there are nearly 100 proven accident investigation methods and models used in 
different industries (Johnson, 2003; Energy Institute, 2008; Kristiansen, 2013). Underwood and 
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Waterson (2013) suggested that the continuous increase in the number of analysis models and 
methods is a result of socio-technical systems (consisting of interactions among human, 
technological, and environmental elements) gradually becoming more complex as well as the 
changing accident causality mechanisms. 
As the number of analysis models and methods has increased, studies have been carried 
out to group the analysis methods, to facilitate the selection and implementation of the most 
relevant methods to be used in accident/incident investigations. Hollnagel and Goteman (2004) 
evaluated a number of accident investigation methods based on their commonalities and basic 
principles, classifying the methods under three main groups: consecutive (sequential) models, 
epidemiological models, and systemic models. This classification has been recognized by many 
researchers, such as, Abbot and Renwick (1999), Hollnagel and Goteman (2004), Tvaryanas 
and Thompson (2008), Arnold (2009), Salmon et al. (2012) and Underwood and Waterson 
(2013). 
 
2. ACCIDENT MODELS 
2.1. Consecutive Models 
Consecutive models suggest that the accidents occur because of discreet events happening 
consecutively, with many sub-causes combining to form the root cause of an accident. 
Therefore, recurrence of accidents can be avoided if these root causes can be eliminated (Sklet, 
2004; Uğurlu et al., 2015a). 
Domino, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Event Tree Analysis are some examples of 
consecutive models. If an accident results from a failure of physical components or due to 
human error, in a simple system, these methods and models are more effective. However, they 
are often inadequate for defining the cause and effect relationship among management, 
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organization, and human elements. Since they do not address these elements in sufficient detail, 
they are often not useful in analysing the human factor in accidents (Rathnayaka et al., 2011). 
 
2.2. Epidemiological Models 
According to these models, an accident occurs as a consequence of both latent and active 
failures in the system (Suchman, 1960; Heinrich et al., 1980; Hollnagel, 2002). The formation 
of an accident resembles the spread of epidemic models (Suchman, 1960; Heinrich et al., 1980; 
Hollnagel, 2002 ;). Thus, the focus should be on the failure to avoid accidents (Suchman, 1960; 
Reason, 1990; Reason et al., 2006). 
The most well-known epidemiological model is the Swiss Cheese Model, also known as 
the Reason Accident Model. Most of the other epidemiological models have been developed 
on the concept of this model. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is 
also one of the methods developed using the Swiss Cheese Model. Epidemiological models 
allow a more detailed examination of the organizational factors and human errors that affect 
the occurrence of accidents that cannot be discovered during superficial examinations. 
Although failures in organizational or management practices represent significant potential 
dangers, these issues can remain latent in a system for a long time, hence, a detailed 
investigation is required. However, some researchers, such as, Rasmussen, (1997), Svedung 
and Rasmussen, (2002), and Leveson, (2001) considered the epidemiological model inadequate 
for examining complex accidents. To address these inadequacies, systemic techniques were 
developed.  
 
2.3. Systemic Techniques 
Contrary to the argument that accidents occur as a sequence of events with a cause and 
effect relationship, systemic techniques suggest that accidents stem from the uncontrolled 
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relationship among the components that form a system. According to Hollnagel, (2002) 
accidents do not occur due to a combination of latent failures and active failures. They occur as 
a result of a combination of human behaviour and the use of unsafe equipment, which seems 
logical upon initial assessment, but in fact impairs the order of a system as it is unsafe. Simply 
eliminating the root causes does not prevent future accidents (Hollnagel, 2002; Ferjencik, 
2011). Failures in the entire system need to be identified and holistically examined (Underwood 
and Waterson, 2013). While systemic techniques allow for a more detailed examination of the 
factors that lead to accidents, some researchers argue that it is difficult for them to be applied 
without sufficient technical expertise (Johansson and Lindgren, 2008; Ferjencik, 2011). 
The selection of the method used in the analysis is as important as the analysis itself, as 
the selection affects the application of the approach to analyse the accident, which is reflected 
in the results. Therefore, the method should be chosen according to the complexity of the 
accident and the elements to be analysed (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013). It is extremely important to investigate and understand the underlying human 
errors and organizational factors in maritime accidents, and specify measures to eliminate or 
minimize accidents (Hetherington et al., 2006; Macrae, 2009). HFACS is a proven method 
customized for identifying human errors. In this method, human factors in accidents are 
examined systematically, and the associated causes and sub-causes are detailed. HFACS has a 
large field of applications (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann et al., 2005; Dambier 
and Hinkelbein, 2006; Li and Harris, 2006; O’Connor, 2008; Rashid et al., 2010; Olsen, 2011; 
Liu et al., 2013). Therefore, it forms the foundation of this study. 
 
3. HFACS LITERATURE REVIEW 
Based on the Swiss cheese model, HFACS was initially developed for investigating 
aviation accidents in 1997 (Wiegmann and Shappell, 1997) and is a generic method for 
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examining human error. The method can be developed and adapted to many industries 
(Wiegmann and Shappell, 1997; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001). Subsequently, HFACS has 
been applied to many fields, such as railway transport (Reinach and Viale, 2006; Baysari et al., 
2008), maritime transport (Celik and Cebi, 2009; Chen and Chou, 2012; Chauvin et al., 2013; 
Akyuz and Celik, 2014), healthcare (Mosaly et al., 2013; Diller et al., 2014), and mining 
(Patterson and Shappell, 2010; Lenne et al., 2012). HFACS is a useful tool for analysing the 
effects of human error on devastating events, accidents, dangerous events, and deficiencies 
(Chauvin et al., 2013; Soner et al., 2015). 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2001) defined the main structure of HFACS in four levels: 
unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences. 
As HFACS’s recognition and fields of application have expanded, over the course of time, 
many researchers from diverse industries- including Weigmann and Shappell (1997) - have 
modified the method for the specific industry being analysed (Dambier and Hinkelbein, 2006; 
Li and Harris, 2006; Tvaryanas et al., 2006; Daramola, 2014). The purpose of such 
modifications is to make this method the most suitable to the industry, within which the human 
factors in accidents are analysed. 
In the 2000s, the effect of human error in maritime accidents reached some 80%, 
prompting an increase in research in this area (Antao and Soares, 2006; Eliopoulou and 
Papanikolaou, 2007; Uğurlu et al., 2015b). Many studies in the literature, particularly in the 
past 15 years, have proven the success and reliability of the HFACS method in analysing human 
error.  
Celik and Cebi (2009) examined the causes of the explosion that occurred on a dry cargo 
ship. In their study, they assessed the human factors identified by the HFACS method, using an 
analytical HFACS based on Fuzzy-Analytic Hierarchy Process (Fuzzy-AHP). The study 
revealed that the most significant unsafe acts result from a lack of skill, and a lack of 
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coordination and communication among the crew. These are the most important preliminary 
conditions for such acts. 
Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2011) examined cases of fires and explosions in the engine 
rooms of ships using HFACS. In the study, the reports of 41 events were examined and 368 
causal factors were identified. The purpose of the study was to develop a customized HFACS 
for revealing the effects of organizational factors and identifying the human factor in engine 
room fires. The sub-causes of engine room fires were identified and the HFACS-Machinery 
Spaces on Ships (MSS) framework was developed without any modifications being made to 
the main structure of HFACS. It was suggested that, rather than organizational factors, 
technological–environmental factors, under the category of Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, 
were the most significant factors, accounting for 41% of all the engine room fires.  
Chauvin et al. (2013) used the HFACS method to examine 27 collision accident reports 
obtained from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) and Transportation Safety 
Board (TSB) databases. The purpose of this study was to identify the human factors in collision 
accidents. They expanded the main framework to develop the HFACS- Collision (Coll) 
structure for collision accidents. The study revealed that the most important factor in collision 
accidents is errors in decision-making. Furthermore, the study identified the most important 
causes of accidents for each category. It was highlighted that Bridge Resource Management 
(BRM) is very important for piloted navigation in narrow waters.  
 HFACS is a hybrid method, containing human factors and system approaches, as well as 
integrating Reason’s Swiss Cheese model. This allows for accident causes to be conceptualized 
as interactions among active and latent system failures. In many studies since 1991, this method 
has been structurally modified and made suitable for various fields of application. The first 
category that researchers added to HFACS was environmental factors. Shappell and Wiegmann 
(2004) divided the environmental factors into two sub-headings, physical and technological 
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environments, which were also included in the HFACS structure for aviation accidents. 
Environmental factors have been addressed under the preconditions for unsafe acts, which is 
the third level of HFACS (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2004). Following this study, Çelik and 
Çebi (2009) and Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2011) also addressed environmental factors under 
preconditions for unsafe acts. Reinach and Viale (2006) developed a customized HFACS- Rail 
Road (RR) structure for railway accidents. The fifth level in the structure was defined as 
External Factors. This level was divided into the sub-categories of regulatory & economic 
control and political, social, & legal environment. Chen and Chou (2012) developed a 
customized HFACS-Marine Accident (MA) structure for maritime accidents and combined the 
preconditions level with the SHEL (Software, Hardware, Environment, and Liveware) model. 
They only modified the preconditions level of the HFACS main framework. The preconditions 
level was divided into the sub-categories of; software, hardware, condition of operators, 
environment, and liveware. Chauvin et al. (2013) defined the fifth level as the external factors 
in addition to the main structure of HFACS. They divided this level into two sub-categories, 
regulatory factors and other. As can be seen from this sample of studies, researchers have tried 
to develop the most suitable structures of HFACS, based on its main structure, geared towards 
relevant industries and the types of accidents. 
 
4. METHOD 
 In this study, we examined collision & contact accidents involving passenger vessels 
between 1991 and 2015 are examined. Passenger ships - usually defined as a ship carrying more 
than 12 passengers - must comply with all relevant International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
regulations, including those in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) and Load Lines Conventions (IMO, 2017). In consideration of this definition, the 
study was conducted to evaluate collisions & contacts involving cruise ships, ferry, ro-pax, ro-
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ro ferry, passenger ships of 500 gross tonnages and more. 35 accident databases were 
scrutinized and a total of 70 collision & contact accident reports from 22 organizations were 
examined (These organisations are outlined in Table 1).  
 
Table 1. List of maritime accident investigation organizations examined in the study 
 
29 of the investigated accidents were of the contact type while other 41 were of the collision 
type. While the accidents were being investigated, officially undeclared accident data was 
dismissed. The accident reports examined in the study were prepared in accordance with the 
IMO circular of the accident investigation and contain detailed information about the accidents 
(formation of the accidents, causes, accident consequences, recommendations, etc.). In this 
study, the HFACS method was used to analyse the accident data, with the study consisting of 4 
phases. The causes of an accident were identified and classified to determine the weight and 
importance of the human factor in passenger vessel accidents. Therefore, at the first phase of 
the study, the active causes and latent failures in collision & contact accidents of passenger 
vessels were identified based on the maritime accident reports. Identification and classification 
of accident causes have been done with a panel of three experts (decision makers). The decision 
makers in the study have sea experience and the necessary academic background about marine 
accidents, safety at sea, human factor and HFACS. As a result of detailed discussions, taking 
into consideration different approaches, the classification process led to the final decisions 
based on a consensus. Therefore, it is expected to obtain results with an acceptable level of 
consistency. The expert group has tried to make the most accurate classification, by reading all 
of the necessary accident reports. In order to facilitate this process, a systematic accident 
database, utilising Microsoft Excel, was created by tabulating accident data in the textual 
format. This database includes information on the following parameters: 
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 accident date,  
 time of the accident, 
 accident location,  
 type of the accident, 
 name of the vessel involved,  
 flag of the vessel involved,  
 technical specifications of the vessel (size, gross tonnage), 
 accident severity as well as the number of deaths/injuries,  
 pilot status, and 
 accident causes.  
In the second phase, the HFACS structures developed since 1991 were examined and checked 
them for compliance within the scope of our study. It was determined that the existing HFACS 
structures required revision to accommodate passenger vessel accidents. Therefore, 
wemodifications were proposed modifications to the main framework and sub-frameworks of 
HFACS, taking into account the nature of the accidents. Based on these modifications, a 
customized HFACS structure was developed for analysing the human factor in passenger vessel 
accidents: Human Factor Analysis and Classification System for Passenger Vessel Accidents 
(HFACS-PV). In the third phase, within the framework of HFACS-PV, the active causes and 
latent failures were classified. It was found that the HFACS-PV framework, by taking into 
consideration the passenger vessel accident reports, was compliant with collision & contact 
accidents. In the final stage, frequency analysis was conducted for the previously categorized 
active causes and latent failures. Thus, the causal factors leading to collision & contact accidents 
of passenger vessels and their relative priorities were revealed, taking into account the 




Figure 1. Flow chart of the study 
 
 
5. HFACS-PV FRAMEWORK AND FOUNDATION 
In the Swiss Cheese Model, which forms the foundation for the main framework of 
HFACS, the events causing an accident are categorized into four diverse levels and these levels 
are grouped under two main headings, namely, latent failures and active failures. The first three 
levels (preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences) 
represent the latent failures and the last level (unsafe acts) represents the active failures. 
According to this model, there are latent failures behind the active failures (Reason, 1990). 
According to Reason’s model, accidents occur because of deficiencies in the first three 
levels paving the way for unsafe acts in the fourth level, i.e., the unsafe acts and behaviours of 
operators. Reason (1990) emphasized that the latent conditions in the system usually remain 
unnoticed until the accident occurs. He applied the Swiss Cheese model to six major events in 
diverse industries - the Chernobyl disaster, King’s Cross fire, Herald of Free Enterprise disaster, 
Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, Bhopal disaster, and Three Mile Island accident -and 
revealed the human factors in these events (Reason, 1990). Reason suggests that people are 
prone to making mistakes, therefore, measures against failures must be identified and 
implemented. The Swiss Cheese model has been used by many researchers from many diverse 
industries to investigate the role of human factor in accidents (Lorenz and Ziff, 2001; Perneger, 
2005; Reason et al., 2006; Sheridan, 2008; Underwood and Waterson, 2014). 
HFACS, which is based on the Swiss Cheese model and adapted to the field used in 
many sectors, needed modification for the analysis of passenger ship accidents in this study. In 
this study, unlike other HFACS studies, it is possible to summarize the formation of ship 
accidents in three stages: causal factors (organizational influence, unsafe supervision and 
preconditions for unsafe acts), lead to root causes (unsafe acts), and accident occurrence is 
inevitable if root causes are combined with appropriate environmental factors.  
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It seems that environmental factors played an important role in the passenger ship 
accidents examined in many of the accident reports. The HFACS structure created in this study 
includes 5 levels, unlike the one developed by Shappell and Wiegmann (1996). The 
environment is at the forefront of the five levels related to human factors. In other words, the 
environment is the last stage in the formation of passenger ship accidents. In many studies 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2004; Reinach and Viale, 2006; Çelik and Çebi, 2009; Schröder-
Hinrichs et al., 2011; Chen and Chou, 2012; Yıldırım et al., 2017) conducted before this 
research, environmental factors have been addressed under the pre-condition for unsafe act 
structure. In this study, it was seen that it would not be appropriate to examine environmental 
factors under this structure for passenger ship accident, because environmental factors are not 
a latent failure or a pre-condition for an unsafe act to turn into an accident. On the contrary it is 
an upper level necessary for an unsafe act to result in an accident. An appropriate envıronment 
is needed in order for an unsafe act to result in an accident. If an unsafe act does not come 
together with the environmental conditions necessary for accident formation, an accident will 
not occur. For this reason, it is not appropriate to examine environmental factors as latent failure 
under the categories of organizational influence or pre-condition for unsafe acts. In addition, 
factors under the structure of environmental factors’ relation with human error are different 
from the factors involved in the other levels. Environmental factors include uncontrollable or 
partially controllable factors. When these factors are considered in the decision-making process, 
accidents can be prevented. 
  
5.1. Classification of Factors within the HFACS-PV Framework 
Based on the analysis and classification of human factors, the HFACS-PV model was 
developed for clear classification of the factors responsible for passenger vessel accidents. The 
proposed modifications in the main framework are marked in red font in Figure 2. The presented 
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HFACS-PV structure is different from other HFACS structures in the literature, taking into 
account the characteristics of passenger vessel accidents. The differences lie in both the main 
framework and the associated sub-elements. Details on the structure of the model and the 
distribution of the factors in accidents within this structure are provided in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
Figure 2. Human Factor Analysis and Classification System for the Passenger Vessel 
Accidents (HFACS-PV) Model 
 
1) Environmental Factors:  
 In the framework established in this study, the environmental factor is considered as a 
separate main level. This study indicates that if there are environmental factors influencing the 
occurrence of an accident, it represents the final stage of the development of a vessel accident. 
Even in the event that all of the necessary factors come together for the development of an 
accident, the accident will not occur unless a key environmental factor is present. This can be 
explained through the use of a simple example. The factors that played a role in the formation 
of a contact accident for the passenger ship The Isle of Arran, which took place on 06/02/2010, 
are listed as follows (MAIB, 2010): 
 Environmental factors: controllable pitch propeller (CPP) malfunction (internal 
environment/non-conformities and failures preventing ship’s motion) and restricted 
manoeuvring area in port (external environment/local restrictions).  
 Unsafe act: unsafe speed (COLREG Rule 6) (violations/regulation violations). 
 Pre-conditions for unsafe acts: master’s management failures (substandard practice of 
team members/bridge team management/inappropriate management activities), lack of 
situational awareness of bridge team members (substandard condition of team 
members/adverse mental conditions), lack of coordination between bridge team members 
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(substandard practice of team members/bridge team management/lack of 
coordination/inboard), lack of communication between bridge and engine control room 
(substandard practice of team members/bridge team management/lack of 
communication/inboard), failure in management of emergency situations (substandard 
practice of team members/bridge team management/inappropriate management 
activities). 
 Unsafe supervision: insufficient maintenance (insufficient supervision), lack of internal 
audit (insufficient supervision). 
 Organizational influences: pre-arrival check (CPP) (organizational process/oversight/ 
safety assessment). 
 When considering this example accident, even if all the factors in the first 4 levels come 
together, the accident will not occur. Appropriate environmental factors are essential for the 
formation of the accident. Appropriate environmental factors for this accident are: restricted 
manoeuvring area in port and controllable pitch propeller (CPP) malfunction. An accident 
would not occur if there was not CPP malfunction in the port. The accident occurred due to a 
CPP malfunction during vessel manoeuvring in the port at unsafe speeds. CPP malfunction is 
an event above the unsafe speed. Similarly, the restricted manoeuvring area (port) is ranked 
above the unsafe speed. The reason for the CPP malfunction to cause a ship accident in the port 
is that the ship is navigating with unsafe speed. For this reason, it would not be suitable to 
examine CPP malfunction under categories of organizational influences or preconditions for 
unsafe acts. It would be more appropriate to examine the factors that caused the CPP 
malfunction under these categories in the event in the accident report. CPP malfunction is not 
a latent factor that plays a role in the creation of unsafe speed. However, unsafe speed is the 
reason behind engine failure that causes accidents within a port. It is possible to think the same 
way about other factors such as: rudder failure, blackout of the ship and bow thruster failure, 
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which is contained within the category of internal environment as it prevents the ships 
movement directly. Factors such as narrow waterways, channels and heavy traffic are also 
placed under external environment/local restrictions. Hence, it would be more appropriate for 
all of these factors to be placed in the environmental factors framework. It would be more 
appropriate to place the factors that cause these factors (engine malfunction, propeller failure, 
etc.) under latent factors, in the event in the accident report.  
 Another example of a marine accident is the collision between the Cotai Strip Expo and 
the Xin Fei. The factors that played a role in the formation of the collision accident between 
these two vessels, on 01/7/2008, are identified as follows (MARDEP, 2011):  
 Environmental factors: engine malfunction (internal environment/non-conformities 
and failures preventing ship’s motion) and narrow waterway (external 
environment/local restrictions). 
 Unsafe act: unsafe speed (COLREG Rule 6) (violations/regulation violations), 
inappropriate collision avoidance manoeuvre (COLREG Rule 8) 
(violations/regulation violations), improper manoeuvring in Traffic Separation 
Scheme (TSS) (COLREG Rule 10) (violations/regulation violations), violation of 
transition rule in overtaking situation (COLREG Rule 13) (violations/regulation 
violations) and improper lookout (COLREG Rule 5) (violations/regulation 
violations). 
 Pre-conditions for unsafe acts: lack of ship-ship communication (substandard 
practices of team members/BTM/lack of communication). 
 Unsafe supervision: inadequate safe distance between ships (planned inappropriate 
operations). 
 Organizational influences: master unfamiliar with the bridge navigation equipment 
(resource management/human resources/lack of training & familiarization/vessel). 
16 
 
Appropriate environmental factors for this accident are narrow waterways (restricted 
manoeuvring area) and engine malfunction. An accident would not occur if there was not an 
engine failure in the narrow waterway.  The accident occurred due to engine failure when the 
ship was navigating in the narrow waterway with unsafe speed and violation of inappropriate 
collision avoidance maneuver (COLREG Rule 8), improper maneuver in TSS (COLREG Rule 
10), violation of transition rule in overtaking situation (COLREG Rule 13) and improper 
lookout. Engine failure is a phenomenon above the unsafe speed and other unsafe acts. 
Similarly, the restricted manoeuvring area (narrow waterway) is above the unsafe speed and 
other unsafe acts. Violations of COLREG Rule 5, 8, 10 and 13 were not caused by engine 
malfunction, these violations occurred due to lack of proper manoeuvring area between vessels 
in order to avoid collision (unsafe supervision) and  lack of communication between vessels 
(pre-condition for unsafe acts).  
In addition, the characteristics of environmental factors are not the same as the ones of 
the factors under the preconditions for unsafe acts level. For example, poor visibility due to 
dense fog and risk of intensive ship traffic will be confronted as a dominant human factor if 
classified under the preconditions for unsafe acts. However, these factors cannot be prevented 
by the ship’s personnel. For this reason, they are characteristically different from other factors, 
as it may not be possible to prevent busy traffic or to prevent dense fog. On the other hand, 
factors under preconditions for unsafe acts such as lack of attention, stress and lack of 
situational awareness are completely different from those mentioned above. For this reason, it 
would not be appropriate to evaluate all such factors under the same category. Therefore, 
environmental factors are considered as a separate level and divided into two subcategories: 





a) Internal environment:  
  These include factors related to the ship, factors affecting ship movement and partially 
controlled by operators. For this study, these non-conformities have been examined under the 
internal environment subcategory with the name of "non-conformities and failures preventing 
ship's motion". They are non-conformities at a higher level of unsafe actions. These non-
conformities include factors that play a role in the accidental conclusion of unsafe actions. 
Figure 3 shows the general structure and the factors examined within this category. 
 
Figure 3. Internal environment 
 
b) External environment:  
  This includes natural conditions and non-vessel factors that neither relate to the structure 
of the vessel nor stem from human contribution or intervention. We further divided this 
categoryThis category is further divided into two sub-categories: weather conditions and 
locational restrictions (Figure 4). The category of weather conditions was examined under two 
sub-headings: conditions impairing visibility and conditions preventing vessel motion. This 
division is aimed at correctly classifying the factors with different characteristics. It allows the 
effects of weather and sea conditions and the effects of the locational restrictions on maritime 
accidents to be easily distinguished.  
 
Figure 4. External environment 
The example factors given under the category headings in Figure 3 and Figure 4 belong 
to the collision & contact accidents investigated in the study.  However, these examples do not 
cover all the factors to be examined under the category. When different accidents are examined 
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similar factors such as, non-conformities that prevent the ship's motion, local restrictions, and 
weather and sea conditions will be examined. 
 
2) Organizational influences:  
   Organizational influence is the first step in the formation of unsafe acts. During the 
process of classification of the factors obtained from the research on accidents, it was found 
that the organizational influences level developed by Shappell and Wiegmann (1996)  was also 
compliant with the maritime industry (Celik and Cebi, 2009; Xi et al., 2009; Xi et al., 2010; 
Chen and Chou, 2012; Chauvin et al., 2013). Therefore, this was divided into three sub-
categories: resource management, organizational climate, and organizational process, as 
conducted in other studies in the literature (Wiegmann and Shappell, 1997; Rothblum, 2000; 
Chauvin et al., 2013).  
a) Resource management:  
  This was further divided into two sub-categories: human resource and 
equipment/facility resource, as shown in Figure 5. This category includes human error by 
organizations operating the vessel and the ports, with regard to resource management. Factors 
such as deficiencies in training and familiarity of the crew, short-staffed crew, and 
inexperienced crew were examined under the category of human resources. On the other hand, 
factors related to deficiencies of equipment and facilities, insufficient equipment, inappropriate 
equipment, and inappropriate ergonomic design were also examined under the category of 
"equipment and facility resource". 
 
Figure 5. Resource management 
b) Organizational climate:  
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 This includes deficiencies and non-conformity in the organizational structure, policies, 
and culture of the employing organization that affect the performances of those working on 
board, as shown in Figure 6. For instance, if a company does not have a zero alcohol and drug 
policy, it will be partly liable if an officer in charge causes an accident whilst under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs. Similarly, if there is no organizational culture that encourages an 
atmosphere of communication and coordination among the team members, the company will 
be partially responsible for the lack of communication between the master and the officers. 
Consequently, if the administrative structure of an organization was not well formed from the 
start, leading to inefficiency and disorder, it is fair to assume that there would be no atmosphere 
of safety and trust in that organization (Wiegmann et al., 2005; Baber, 2007; Chen and Chou, 
2012).  
Accident investigators particularly address deficiencies and non-conformity in the reports 
on aviation accidents. However, detailed information regarding deficiencies and non-
conformity is limited or does not exist within the reports of the passenger accidents in this study. 
Therefore, it is not possible to assess this category effectively, even if it is included in the 
HFACS-PV structure. When other studies were examined in the literature, very few factors 
regarding the organizational climate were identified (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011; Chen and 
Chou, 2012; Chauvin et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013). Declaring such non-conformities can lead 
to commercial concerns or loss of prestige for companies. Hence, non-conformities under this 
category represent sensitive information that companies may be concerned about, making such 
non-conformities difficult to identify in marine accident reports. 
 
Figure 6. Organizational climate  
 
c) Organizational process:  
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This includes the deficiencies in the management of the organization, the deficiencies in 
safety assessments regarding the legal processes (work/rest hours, time pressure, motivation, 
shift orders, etc.) and their reviews (risk analysis, risk management, etc.), and any non-
conformities (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000). Within the framework developed by Shappell 
and Wiegman (2000), the procedure heading was changed to legal deficiencies, and these legal 
deficiencies were examined under two sub-categories, namely, procedure-based deficiencies 
and legislation-based deficiencies as demonstrated by Figure 7. Factors such as mistakes in the 
process of planning the manoeuvring operation, negligently prepared manoeuvre or navigation 
plans, lack of risk assessment procedures, and neglected risk assessments prior to operations 
are examined under the organizational process.  
 
Figure 7. Organizational process 
 
3) Unsafe supervision:  
  Unsafe supervision is the second step in the formation of unsafe acts. There are three 
sub-categories at this level: insufficient supervision, planned inappropriate operations, and 
failure to correct a known problem (Figure 8). In the core HFACS structure of Shappell and 
Wiegmann (2000), a fourth sub-category of supervisory violations was also included. However, 
considering the causal factors examined under this structure (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001; 
Shappell and Wiegmann, 2004), it would be more appropriate to examine these factors for 
passenger vessels within the violations and substandard conditions of team members. 
Therefore, the sub-category of supervisory violations was removed from the HFACS-PV 
structure. Factors regarding matters such as the failure to carry out routine tests and checks, 
deficiencies in implementation of the planned maintenance system, inappropriately planned 
operations (navigation plan, number of lookouts on shift, etc.), and failure to correct a 
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previously identified problem (sailing with a malfunctioning radar, etc.) are included under the 
Unsafe Supervision category.  
 
Figure 8. Unsafe supervision 
 
4) Preconditions for unsafe acts:  
  The preconditions for the unsafe acts level that prepares unsafe actions, which is also 
located at the core of HFACS structure includes factors that set the ground for unsafe acts of 
the operators. It was emphasized by Shappell and Wiegmann (2000), among others, that this 
frame is important for accident occurrence. Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) emphasized that it 
is insufficient to only focus on unsafe actions to understand the accident occurrence and prevent 
accidents; only focusing on unsafe actions to prevent accidents, is similar to focusing on health 
symptoms, such as high fever, to prevent the disease. Pre-conditions of unsafe acts are the last 
level playing a role in the formation of unsafe acts. Unlike Shappell and Wiegmann’s (2000) 
and other studies in the literature (Celik and Cebi, 2009; Xi et al., 2009; Chen and Chou, 2012; 
Chauvin et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013) these factors, which set the ground for the unsafe acts 
of the operators, were divided into two subcategories; malfunctions in the electronic navigation 
aids and substandard team members.  
a) Substandard team members:  
  This category is divided into two sub categories; substandard conditions of team 
members and substandard practices of team members. The reason for such a division is due to 
the fact that vessel management (administration) is carried out by a team. From the master to 
the helmsman (including the pilot) on the bridge and from the chief engineer to the oiler in the 
engine room, everyone is a member of the team. Navigation or manoeuvre can only be safely 
achieved when there is accord and communication among the team members. Therefore, 
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analysis of an accident should focus on the substandard conditions and practices of all the team 
members (not just the master) on board at the time of the accident. 
i) Substandard condition of team members:  
  This category includes adverse conditions and limitations affecting both mentally and 
physically those involved in manoeuvring and navigating the vessel, including the pilot. This 
category is demonstrated in Figure 9. Adverse mental conditions include factors such as mental 
fatigue, stress, lack of attention, lack of situational awareness, excessive self-confidence, and 
recklessness. Adverse physical conditions include factors such as sickness (flu, cold, etc.), 
physical fatigue, and sleeplessness. These conditions place strain on the physical and mental 
capacity of a person. An example of this is night lookouts; the lookout efficiency of the crew 
decreases at night since there is a lack of sufficient light. One requires more effort to perform 
efficiently than they would during the day. Therefore, lookout on the night shift is one of the 
conditions for unsafe actions.  
 
Figure 9. Substandard conditions of team members 
 
ii) Substandard practices of team members:  
  This category, which is included in the core structure of the HFACS as substandard 
practices of operators, was applied to passenger vessel accidents without any change in the 
structure (Shappel and Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann et al., 2005). It is worth noting that the 
framework was named to include the substandard practices of all the team members, as shown 
in Figure 10. Accordingly, the substandard practices of the team members were divided into 
two sub-categories: readiness for operation and bridge team management. 
Readiness for Operation: This sub-category is very important for completing a task 
safely and appropriately. Conditions that affect readiness for operation also pave the way for 
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unsafe actions. Therefore, the readiness for operation takes into account factors that affect the 
readiness of the team members in physical, mental, and psychological terms. Some of these 
factors include being under the influence of drugs, being intoxicated, and violating work and 
rest hours. 
Bridge Team Management: As mentioned before, the management of a vessel is 
teamwork. The fundamental components of efficient team management are communication, 
coordination, and management activities. Therefore, the components in team management were 
divided into three sub-categories in this study: inappropriate management activities, lack of 
communication, and lack of coordination. The deficiencies, failures, and non-conformity in 
these sub-categories trigger unsafe actions directly. Substandard acts within bridge team 
management include factors such as lack of authority, deficiency in management, loose 
management, lack of communication, and lack of coordination.  
 
Figure 10. Substandard practices of team members 
b) Malfunctions in the electronic navigation aids:  
  These are preconditions that play a role in the emergence of unsafe actions. When the 
structure and the formation of these malfunctions are taken into consideration, examination of 
the factors under organizational influence or unsafe supervision levels is not likely to be 
appropriate. Because these malfunctions are emerging due to the factors under the unsafe 
supervision or organizational influences level. This is because these malfunctions emerge due 
to factors under the unsafe supervision or organizational influence levels. For this reason, it 
would be more appropriate to examine it at the last stage before the unsafe action takes place. 
The general structure of the framework and factors examined are shown in Figure 11. 
 




5) Unsafe Acts:  
 This includes inappropriate acts and the misconduct of team members. They are the 
triggering acts at the last level that cause an accident. According to the HFACS structure 
developed by Wiegmann and Shappell (1997), Unsafe Acts can be divided into two sub-
categories: errors and violations resulting in accidents. Errors include acts performed 
unintentionally during otherwise proper conduct, which prevent successful performance. 
Violations include improper acts performed intentionally, i.e., violation of the rules and 
regulations (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann et al., 2005). The accident reports 
examined in this study revealed that it is appropriate for errors and violations to be used for the 
classification of the human factors in accidents. Therefore, errors and violations are included in 
the HFAC-PV structure. However, violations were not categorized as “routine” or 
“exceptional,” as defined by Wiegmann and Shappell (1997). Violations were divided into three 
categories: legal arrangement violations, procedure violations, and abuse of authority, as a 
classification of the violations on the basis of legal arrangements and procedures would better 
explain the seriousness and legal aspect of the action performed. Legal arrangement violations 
are the violations of international/national rules that must be complied with. Procedure 
violations are the violations of written directives that vary according to the structure of the 
organization operating the vessel and are usually formulated based on experiences.  
The accident investigation study that was carried out revealed that accidents caused by 
violations occur differently due to abuse of authority. For instance, a radar device has many 
safety alarms (such as, destination alarm, electronic bearing, range marker alarms, etc.), 
subsequently, these alarms sound frequently during shifts on-board and may disturb some of 
the officers and masters in charge. Hence, these alarms are often switched off. Switching off 
these alarms increases the burden of lookout on shift workers. This, when combined with the 
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other factors, can lead to an accident. On the other hand, when the officers or masters in charge 
- disturbed by the radio sounds on the bridge - decrease the volume of the radio, it is an abuse 
that leads to auditory lookout violation. Therefore, abuse of authority was also examined within 
the category of violations in the HFACS-PV structure. 
a) Errors:  
 According to studies in the literature, errors include those of skill (such as failure to 
operate the machine control panel effectively), decision-making (such as attempting to avoid 
collision & contact by manoeuvring in the wrong direction) and perception (such as incorrect 
interpretation of the effects of the wind and current on the vessel) (Shappell and Wiegmann, 
2000; Chauvin et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013). The Error framework is demonstrated in Figure 
12. 
Skill-based errors are unintentional errors stemming from lack of knowledge and 
experience. Decision-based errors are those that occur as a result of incorrect intentional choices 
and acts. Decision-based errors are also referred to as “honest mistakes” in the literature 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000; Baber, 2007). Perceptual errors are errors that occur due to 
incorrect perception or interpretation of quantities such as distance, altitude, or speed.  
Figure 12. Errors 
 
b) Violations:  
 Violations were examined under three sub-categories: violation of legal arrangements 
(regulations), violation of procedures, and abuse of authority, as shown in Figure 13. 
Violations of legal arrangements (regulations): These include factors regarding 
intentional neglect or non-execution of the legal arrangements published by the IMO, 
flag states, or competent authorities. Acting contrary to the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG), non-compliance with the shift 
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arrangements stipulated by the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCW), and non-compliance with the 
work–rest hours under the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) are typical examples 
of legal arrangement violations.  
Procedure violations: These include violating the arrangements prepared by vessel 
operators, particularly by maritime companies on the basis of national and 
international rules and experience. These procedures are not as strong as regulations 
in legal terms. Violations of procedures such as navigation safety, anchoring, 
berthing, and other manoeuvring and shift handover procedures are some examples 
of these violations. 
Abuse of authority: This is an intentional violation made knowingly and wilfully. It 
is improper use of a position of influence, power or authority knowingly and wilfully 
(UN, 2008). For instance, in the Costa Concordia accident (IMO, 2016), the deviation 
from the route in order for the passengers to see the islands more closely was not a 
procedure violation or regulation violation since the master of the ship is vested with 
the legal authority to deviate from the route. However, the reason for the deviation 
was not based on the safety of the vessel or the passengers and that navigation safety 
was violated for the entertainment of the passengers. This signifies that the master 
abused his authority to deviate from the route.  
 
Figure 13. Violations 
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this study it has been found appropriate to consider environmental factors as a separate 
main level in the formation of ship accidents. Factors that fall under the context of 
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environmental factors are not a latent failure or unsafe acts, but rather an upper level that leads 
to accidental consequences of unsafe acts. For this reason it would be appropriate to consider it 
as the final stage in the formation of accidents. In this study, 517 factors have been identified 
by examining 70 collision & contact accidents that occurred on passenger vessels. Frequency 
and percentage values were calculated according to 517 factors. The HFACS-PV model for 
collision & contact accidents together with the identified frequency and percentage values of 
each category or sub-category is shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. The frequency of the factors causing collision & contact accidents 
 
 
Environmental factors have been found to be 19.92 % effective in the formation of 
collision & contact accidents involving passenger ships. This result is in line with the ones in 
the studies for other vessel types in the literature (Xi et al., 2009; Chen and Chou, 2012; 
Chauvin et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013). The most effective among environmental factors is 
local restrictions with 11.41%. Local restrictions are among the most significant impediments 
on vessel manoeuvring. It is not possible to eliminate local restrictions, but these risks can be 
kept under control by assigning experienced team members who have worked in the area for a 
sufficient period of time. Therefore, companies operating passenger vessels should give 
importance to experience in navigation during the selection and assignment of crew members 
(including the master). 
Another important cause within the environmental factors is unfavourable weather and 
sea conditions. It was found that unfavourable weather and sea conditions account for 30 
accidents that passenger vessels were involved in, with 12 out of 30 accidents occurred in strong 
winds. The root cause of this is the incorrect interpretation of the effect of the wind on the vessel 
by team members. It is not possible to eliminate unfavourable weather and sea conditions. 
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However, in order to avoid accidents, team members should know the vessel well and be able 
to correctly interpret the effects of the weather and sea conditions in vessel manoeuvring. 
Therefore, team members meant to carry out the management of the vessel should be assigned 
based on professional experience and passenger vessel experience.  
While the non-conformities and failures preventing the ship's motion responsible for 
accidents (16 accidents) were sudden, uncontrolled events and human error also played a part 
in these accidents. It is possible to avoid failures with planned maintenance, conscious operation 
(within the guidelines and operational limits), and timely supervision and checks.  
Unsafe acts are the most significant in the occurrence of collision & contact accidents 
with 35.01%. Errors and violations under this category have a frequency of 17.61% and 17.41% 
respectively. The most important sub-category that contributes to collision & contact accidents 
within the violations category is the regulation violations (14.7%). The most common violations 
under the regulation violations are COLREG Rule 5 (inappropriate lookout) and COLREG Rule 
6 (unsafe speed). Among the collision & contact accidents examined in this study, violations of 
COLREG Rule 6 were found in 25 accidents and violations of COLREG Rule 5 were found in 
24 accidents. The results of this stage of the study show consistency with the results of some 
accident analysis studies in the literature. In other studies carried out by Chauvin et al., (2013), 
Uğurlu et al., (2013), and Uğurlu et al., (2015b) for different vessel types), the emphasis was 
laid on the importance of COLREG Rule 6 and COLREG Rule 5 in collision & contact 
accidents. Among the errors, the most important sub-category was found to be bridge team 
management errors with 11.8%. The most significant bridge team management errors include 
lack of a chain of command among the team members, lack of communication and coordination, 
and lack of team spirit. If the master of the vessel is a very competent team manager, the team 
members embrace their jobs and work in harmony with fellow team members, making vessel 
operations safer.  
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Preconditions for unsafe acts are the second most significant, with a 30.37%. The most 
important cause under the preconditions for unsafe acts level is substandard bridge team 
management practices (11.8%). The most significant problems found in substandard bridge 
team management practices are lack of ship-to-ship communication (10 accidents) and a lack 
of master–officer-in-charge coordination (11 accidents). Unsafe acts occur due to deficiencies 
in the first three levels (organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and preconditions for 
unsafe acts), as suggested in the Swiss Cheese Model. Similar to many other studies carried out 
previously by Celik and Cebi (2009) and Chauvin et al., (2013), this study also revealed that 
the most important among the first three levels is preconditions for unsafe acts. Therefore, in 
order to avoid or minimize accidents, the focus should be on attempting to avoid the occurrence 
of preconditions for unsafe acts. In doing so, it will be possible to avoid the unsafe acts of team 
members to some extent. Among the preconditions for unsafe acts, one cause of accident 
specific to passenger vessels is the excessive workload introduced by Pilotage Exemption 
Certificate (PEC). In order to avoid passenger vessel accidents, it is extremely important that 
companies give particular attention to experience in navigation during the assignment of 
masters. However, exempting the vessel from pilot services on the basis of the master’s 
experience and a pilotage exemption certificate would increase the risk of an accident due to 
the excessive workload on the master, because a master holding a PEC would have to act as a 
master and a pilot at the same time in the area. In this study, three accidents were found to have 
stemmed from excessive workload on the master due to pilotage exemption. Therefore, an 
important step to avoid the occurrence of such accidents would be to make pilotage compulsory 
in relevant areas. 
Organizational influences have 11.28% in the occurrence of collision & contact accidents 
of passenger vessels. The most important subcategory in this level is human resources 
management, with 3.9%. Non-conformities in the human resource management of companies 
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operating a vessel affect the occurrence of accidents. In order to avoid such accidents, 
companies should determine their principles for personnel selection and assignment on the basis 
of professional experience and culture of safety. Even the slightest inappropriate assignment 
(lack of training, familiarity, and experience) in the upper team (master, chief engineer, and 
chiefs) may affect all vessel operations and threaten the safety of the vessel and its passengers. 
Human resources management is extremely important, not only in terms of selection and 
assignment but also in terms of maintaining safety. Another important sub-category examined 
under the organizational influences level is inappropriate ergonomic design. Design flaws were 
found in nine collision & contact accidents. There are only a limited number of studies in the 
literature that highlight the effects of design flaws in vessel accidents (Chauvin et al., 2013; 
Han and Ding, 2013; Akhtar and Utne, 2014). Therefore, it is recommended to take into account 
the deficiencies associated with design flaws to avoid collision & contact accidents. Design 
flaws causing collision & contact accidents of passenger vessels were found to be designs 
limiting visibility, overhead lighting impairing visibility, bridge sound insulation inhibiting 
auditory lookout, bridge ergonomic design flaws, wing wheel panel ergonomic design flaws, 
and bridge manoeuvre console ergonomic design flaws. The bridge’s design and ergonomics 
are extremely important for maintaining the safety of the bridge navigation shift. Design flaws 
are not factors that can be corrected by the bridge team. The chart console, electronic navigation 
devices, and communication devices should be placed on the bridge in such a manner that they 
do not inhibit visual lookout and can be used effectively, even when there is only one watch-
keeper on the bridge. Therefore, ergonomics should be taken into account during the 
construction and maintenance of vessels in the shipyard. The effects of the organizational 
environment within the category of organizational influences (which is very important in 
aviation accidents) on the collision & contact accidents of passenger vessels could not be 
identified completely. This is because this heading was not investigated in detail in the existing 
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accident reports for passenger vessels. Therefore, investigative authorities should look into the 
organizational climate and safety culture of companies in charge of operating a vessel involved 
in an accident. 
The category of unsafe supervision has 3.48% in passenger vessel accidents. The most 
important within this category is planned inappropriate operations (2.32%). The most important 
planned inappropriate operations are inappropriate navigation plan (five accidents) and lack of 




In this study, unlike other studies in the literature, a customized HFACS structure for the 
analysis of human factor in passenger ship accidents has been presented. In addition to the 
traditional, core HFACS structure, the biggest change in the structure is the addition of 
environmental factors as the fifth and final level to the main framework. Similarly, the HFACS 
structure has been aligned with the maritime sector by making changes associated with the 
unsafe acts and the corresponding preconditions. Thus, a modified HFACS-PV structure has 
been developed for analysing passenger vessels' collision & contacts. 
Active causes and latent failures were classified under the structure of HFACS-PV. It was 
found that the HFACS-PV framework was compliant with collision & contact accidents, taking 
into consideration the passenger vessel accident reports. In the final stage, a frequency analysis 
was conducted for the previously categorized active causes and latent failures. Thus, the causal 
factors leading to collision & contact accidents of passenger vessels and their relative priorities 
were revealed, taking into account the numeric data of the study. In addition, recommendations 
have been made for the prevention of accidents. The results of this study are realistic, and 
expected to be useful for preventing ship accidents. The HFACS-PV structure makes it much 
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easier to understand and interpret the occurrence of vessel accidents. In future studies, the 
compatibility of this structure with accidents in passenger vessels and ones in other vessel types, 
can be analysed. 
 
8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 This study has been carried out in Turkey and United Kingdom with the cooperation of 
Karadeniz Technical University and Liverpool John Moores University under the titled of  
research "Lessons learned from last twenty years of passenger ship accidents and accident-free 
future". The study was supported by TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research 
Council of Turkey/2219 scientific research support program). The authors would like to thank 
TUBITAK, who financially supported the study. 
 
REFERENCES 
Abbot, J., Renwick, N., 1999. Pirates? Maritime piracy and societal security in Southeast Asia. Global 
Change, Peace & Security 11, 7-24. 
Akhtar, M.J., Utne, I.B., 2014. Human fatigue’s effect on the risk of maritime groundings – A Bayesian 
Network modelling approach. Safety Science 62, 427-440. 
Akyuz, E., Celik, M., 2014. Utilisation of cognitive map in modelling human error in marine accident 
analysis and prevention. Safety Science 70, 19-28. 
Antao, P., Soares, C.G., 2006. Fault-tree models of accident scenarios of RoPax vessels. International 
Journal of Automation and Computing 3, 107-116. 
Arnold, R., 2009. A qualitative comparative analysis of SOAM and STAMP in ATM occurrence 
investigation. Master's Thesis, Lund University, Lund, Sweden. 
Baber, E., 2007. İnsan Faktörü Analizi ve Sınıflandırma Sistemi (HFACS) ve Kara Havacılık Kazalarına 
Uygulanabilirliği. Yüksek Lisans Tezi Master's Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, Ankara, Turkey. 
Baysari, M.T., Mcintosh, A.S., Wilson, J.R., 2008. Understanding the human factors contribution to 
railway accidents and incidents in Australia. Accident Analysis & Prevention 40, 1-8. 
Celik, M., Cebi, S., 2009. Analytical HFACS for investigating human errors in shipping accidents. 
Accident Analysis & Prevention 41, 66-75. 
Chauvin, C., Lardjane, S., Morel, G., Clostermann, J.P., Langard, B., 2013. Human and organisational 
factors in maritime accidents: analysis of collisions at sea using the HFACS. Accident Analysis 
& Prevention 59, 26-37. 
Chen, S.T., Chou, Y.H., 2012. Examining Human Factors for Marine Casualties using HFACS - 
Maritime Accidents (HFACS-MA). 2012 12th International Conference on Its 
Telecommunications (Itst-2012), 385-390. 
Chen, S.T., Wall, A., Davies, P., Yang, Z.L., Wang, J., Chou, Y.H., 2013. A Human and Organisational 
Factors (HOFs) analysis method for marine casualties using HFACS-Maritime Accidents 
(HFACS-MA). Safety Science 60, 105-114. 
33 
 
Dambier, M., Hinkelbein, J., 2006. Analysis of 2004 German general aviation aircraft accidents 
according to the HFACS model. Air Medical Journal 25, 265-9. 
Daramola, A.Y., 2014. An investigation of air accidents in Nigeria using the Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS) framework. Journal of Air Transport Management 35, 39-
50. 
Diller, T., Helmrich, G., Dunning, S., Cox, S., Buchanan, A., Shappell, S., 2014. The Human Factors 
Analysis Classification System (HFACS) applied to health care. American Journal of Medical 
Quality 29, 181-90. 
Dimitris, K., Dracos, V., 2008. Risk evaluation for RoPax vessels. Proceedings of the Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers, Part M: Journal of Engineering for the Maritime Environment 222, 13-
26. 
Eliopoulou, E., Papanikolaou, A., 2007. Casualty analysis of large tankers. Journal of Marine Science 
and Technology 12, 240-250. 
Etman, E., Halawa, A., 2007. Safety Culture, the Cure for Human Error: a Critique. IAMU Journal, 115-
126. 
FCCA 2014. Cruise Industry Overview 2014. Mexico: Florida-Caribbean Cruise Association. Accessed: 
10 November 2016. http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2014-Cruise-Industry-Overview-and-
Statistics.pdf 
Ferjencik, M., 2011. An integrated approach to the analysis of incident causes. Safety Science 49, 886-
905. 
Grabowski, M., You, Z., Song, H., Wang, H., Merrick, J.R., 2010. Sailing on Friday: Developing the 
link between safety culture and performance in safety-critical systems. Systems, Man and 
Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans, IEEE Transactions 40, 263-284. 
Han, D.F., Ding, S., 2013. Review of human factors in maritime system. Applied Mechanics and 
Materials 397-400, 679-682. 
Harrald, J.R., Mazzuchi, T., Spahn, J., Van Dorp, R., Merrick, J., Shrestha, S., Grabowski, M., 1998. 
Using system simulation to model the impact of human error in a maritime system. Safety 
Science 30, 235-247. 
Heinrich, H.W., Petersen, D.C., Roos, N.R., Hazlett, S., 1980. Industrial accident prevention: A safety 
management approach, McGraw-Hill Companies, New York, US. 
Hetherington, C., Flin, R., Mearns, K., 2006. Safety in shipping: The human element. Journal of Safety 
Research 37, 401-411. 
Hollnagel, E., 2002. Understanding accidents-from root causes to performance variability.  Human 
Factors and Power Plants. Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE 7th Conference. 1-1-6. 
Hollnagel, E., Goteman, O., 2004. The functional resonance accident model. Proceedings of cognitive 
system engineering in process plant, 155-161. 
Hollnagel, E., Speziali, J., 2008. Study on Developments in Accident Investigation Methods: A Survey 
of the State of the Art. SKI Report 2008:50. Sweden: Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. 
IMO, 1974. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). M. S. Committee. United 
Kingdom, International Maritime Organization: 845. 
IMO, 2008. Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation 
into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code). MSC 255(84), United 
Kingdom: International Maritime Organization. 
IMO, 2016. Global Integrated Shipping Information System. IMO web page. Accessed: 19 October 
2016. http://gisis.imo.org/Public/Default.aspx 
IMO, 2017. Passenger ships. IMO web page. Accessed. 28 November 2017. 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Regulations/Pages/PassengerShips.aspx 
Energy Institute, 2008. Guidance on Investigating and Analysing Human and Organisational Factors 
Aspects of Incidents and Accidents. Energy Institute, London, United Kingdom. 
Equasis (2015). The world merchant fleetin 2014. EMSA, European Maritime Safety Agfency. 
Johansson, B., Lindgren, M., 2008. A quick and dirty evaluation of resilience enhancing properties in 
safety critical systems.  Proceedings of the third symposium on resilience engineering, Juan-les-
Pins, France.  
Johnson, C., 2003. A Handbook of Incident and Accident Reporting. Glasgow University Press, 
Glasgow, Scotland.  
34 
 
Kim, S.W., Wang, J., Wall, A., Kwon, Y.S., 2005. Formal Fire Safety Assessment of Passenger Ships. 
Safety and Reliability 26, 52-55. 
Kristiansen, S., 2013. Maritime transportation: safety management and risk analysis. Routledge, Oxford, 
UK.  
Lenne, M.G., Salmon, P.M., Liu, C.C., Trotter, M., 2012. A systems approach to accident causation in 
mining: an application of the HFACS method. Accident Analysis & Prevention 48, 111-7. 
Leveson, N., 2001. Part I: Event-Based Models. Evaluating Accident Models using Recent Aerospace 
Accidents. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts, US. 
Li, W.C., Harris, D., 2006. Pilot error and its relationship with higher organizational levels: HFACS 
analysis of 523 accidents. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 77, 1056-1061. 
Liu, D.H., Nickens, T., Hardy, L., Boquet, A., 2013. Effect of HFACS and Non-HFACS-Related Factors 
on Fatalities in General Aviation Accidents Using Neural Networks. International Journal of 
Aviation Psychology 23, 153-168. 
Lois, P., Wang, J., Wall, A., Ruxton, T., 2004. Formal safety assessment of cruise ships. Tourism 
Management 25, 93-109. 
Lorenz, C.D., Ziff, R.M., 2001. Precise determination of the critical percolation threshold for the three-
dimensional “Swiss cheese” model using a growth algorithm. The Journal of Chemical Physics 
114, 3659-3661. 
Macrae, C., 2009. Human factors at sea: common patterns of error in groundings and collisions. 
Maritime Policy & Management 36, 21-38. 
MAIB, 2010. Marine Accident Investigation Branch. MAIB web page. Accessed: 27 November 2017. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/547c6fc0ed915d4c1000003d/IsleofArran 
Report.pdf 
MARDEP, 2011. Hong Kong Marine Department, MARDEP web page. Accessed: 20 November 2017. 
http://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/publication/pdf/mai080701_f.pdf 
Mosaly, P., Mazur, L.M., Miller, S., Eblan, M., JONES, E.L., 2013. Applying Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS) to the Analysis of Good Catches in Radiation Oncology. 
International Journal of Radiation Oncology Biology Physics 87, 683-683. 
O'connor, P., 2008. HFACS with an additional layer of granularity: validity and utility in accident 
analysis. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 79, 599-606. 
Olsen, N. S., 2011. Coding ATC incident data using HFACS: Inter-coder consensus. Safety Science 49, 
1365-1370. 
Patterson, J.M., Shappell, S.A., 2010. Operator error and system deficiencies: analysis of 508 mining 
incidents and accidents from Queensland, Australia using HFACS. Accident Analysis & 
Prevention 42, 1379-1385. 
Perneger, T.V., 2005. The Swiss cheese model of safety incidents: are there holes in the metaphor? BMC 
health services research 5, 1. 
Rashid, H.S.J., Place, C.S., Braithwaite, G.R., 2010. Helicopter maintenance error analysis: Beyond the 
third order of the HFACS-ME. International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 40, 636-647. 
Rasmussen, J., 1997. Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem. Safety Science 27, 
183-213. 
Rathnayaka, S., Khan, F., Amyotte, P., 2011. SHIPP methodology: Predictive accident modeling 
approach. Part I: Methodology and model description. Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection 89, 151-164. 
Reason, J., 1990. Human Error. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, US. 
Reason, J., Hollnagel, E., Paries, J., 2006. Revisiting the «Swiss cheese» model of accidents. Journal of 
Clinical Engineering 27, 110-115. 
Reinach, S., Viale, A., 2006. Application of a human error framework to conduct train accident/incident 
investigations. Accident Analysis & Prevention 38, 396-406. 
Rothblum, A.M., 2000. Human error and marine safety.  National Safety Council Congress and Expo, 
Orlando, Florida, US. 
Salmon, P.M., Cornelissen, M., Trotter, M.J., 2012. Systems-based accident analysis methods: A 
comparison of Accimap, HFACS, and STAMP. Safety Science 50, 1158-1170. 
35 
 
Schröder-Hinrichs, J.U., Baldauf, M., Ghirxi, K.T., 2011. Accident investigation reporting deficiencies 
related to organizational factors in machinery space fires and explosions. Accident Analysis & 
Prevention 43, 1187-1196. 
Shappell, S. A., Wiegmann, D. A., 1996. US naval aviation mishaps, 1977-92: differences between 
single-and dual-piloted aircraft. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 67(1), 65-69. 
Shappell, S.A., Wiegmann, D.A., 2000. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System-
HFACS. US Federal Aviation Administration, Illinois, US. 
Shappell, S.A., Wiegmann, D.A., 2004. HFACS analysis of military and civilian aviation accidents: A 
North American comparison.  Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the International Society 
of Air Safety Investigators. Australia, 1-8. 
Sheridan, T.B., 2008. Risk, human error, and system resilience: fundamental ideas. The Journal of the 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 50, 418-426. 
Sklet, S., 2004. Comparison of some selected methods for accident investigation. Journal of Hazardous 
Materials 111, 29-37. 
Soner, O., Asan, U., Celik, M., 2015. Use of HFACS–FCM in fire prevention modelling on board ships. 
Safety Science 77, 25-41. 
Suchman, E.A., 1960. A conceptual analysis of the accident phenomenon. Social Problems 8, 241-253. 
Svedung, I., Rasmussen, J., 2002. Graphic representation of accident scenarios: mapping system 
structure and the causation of accidents. Safety Science, 40, 397-417. 
Tvaryanas, A.P., Thompson, W.T., Constable, S.H., 2006. Human factors in remotely piloted aircraft 
operations: HFACS analysis of 221 mishaps over 10 years. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine 77, 724-32. 
Tvaryanas, A.P., Thompson, W.T., 2008. Recurrent error pathways in HFACS data: analysis of 95 
mishaps with remotely piloted aircraft. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 79, 525-
532. 
Uğurlu, Ö. Yildirim, U., Yuksekyildiz, E., 2013. Marine Accident Analysis with GIS. Journal of 
Shipping and Ocean Engineering 3, 21-29. 
Uğurlu, Ö. Yıldırım, U., Başar, E., 2015a. Analysis of Grounding Accidents Caused by Human Error. 
Journal of Marine Science and Technology 23, 748-760. 
Uğurlu, Ö. Köse, E., Yıldırım, U., Yüksekyıldız, E., 2015b. Marine accident analysis for collision and 
grounding in oil tanker using FTA method. Maritime Policy & Management 42, 163-185. 
UN, 2008. Secretary-General's Bulletin ST/SGB/2008/5. Secretariat, United Nations. 
Underwood, P., Waterson, P., 2013. Accident analysis models and methods: guidance for safety 
professionals. Loughborough University, England. 
Underwood, P., Waterson, P., 2014. Systems thinking, the Swiss Cheese Model and accident analysis: 
a comparative systemic analysis of the Grayrigg train derailment using the ATSB, AcciMap and 
STAMP models. Accident Analysis & Prevention 68, 75-94. 
Wiegmann, D.A., Boquet, A., Detwiler, C., Holcomb, K., Shappell, S.A., 2005. Human Error and 
General Aviation Accidents: A Comprehensive, Fine-grained Analysis Using HFACS. Federal 
Aviation Administration, Washington, US. 
Wiegmann, D.A., Shappell, S.A., 1997. Human factors analysis of postaccident data: Applying 
theoretical taxonomies of human error. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology 7, 67-
81. 
Wiegmann, D.A., Shappell, S.A., 2001. Human error analysis of commercial aviation accidents: 
application of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification system (HFACS). Aviation, 
Space, and Environmental Medicine 72, 1006-1016. 
Xi, Y., Chen, W., Fang, Q., Hu, S., 2010. HFACS model based data mining of human factors-a marine 
study.  Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM), 2010 IEEE International 
Conference, Pittsburgh, US. 
Xi, Y.T., Fang, Q.G., Chen, W.J., Hu, S.P., 2009. Case-based HFACS for Collecting, Classifying and 
Analyzing Human Errors in Marine Accidents. 2009 Ieee International Conference on Industrial 
Engineering and Engineering Management, 1-4, 2148-2153. 
Yıldırım, U., Başar, E., Uğurlu, Ö. 2017. Assessment of collisions and grounding accidents with human 
factors analysis and classification system (HFACS) and statistical methods. Safety Science. 
 








 Figure 2. Human Factor Analysis and Classification System for the Passenger Vessel Accidents (HFACS-PV) Model
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 Figure 11. Malfunctions in the electronical navigation aids 
 
 
Figure 12. Errors 
 
 
 Figure 13. Violations
 
Table 1. List of maritime accident investigation organizations examined in the study 
Name of the Organization Abbreviation Central Country(s) 
Accident Investigation Board Norway AIBN Norway 
American Bureau of Shipping ABS USA 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau ATSB Australia 
Bahamas Maritime Authority BMA Bahamas 
Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation BSU Germany 
Bureau d'enquêtessur les événements de mer BEAMER France 
Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Programme CHIRP United Kingdom 
Countryman & McDaniel C& M USA 
Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board DMAIB Denmark 
Department of Marine Services and Merchant Shipping ADOMS Antique and Barbuda 
Dutch Safety Board DSB Netherlands 
European Maritime Safety Agency  EMSA Portugal 
Global Integrated Shipping Information System GISIS United Kingdom 
International Transportation Safety Association ITSA 
USA, Canada, Sweden, 
Netherlands 
Isle of Man Ship Registry IOMSR United Kingdom 
Japan Transport Safety Board JTSB Japan 
KAIK Accident Investigation Board KAİK Turkey 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch MAIB United Kingdom 
Marine Accident Investigation Committee Cyprus MAIC Cyprus 
Marine Accident Investigators’ International Forum MAIF United Kingdom 
Marine Casualty Investigation Board MCIB Ireland 
Marine Department-Hong Kong MARDEP China 
Maritime Safety Administration of People’s Republic of China MSA China 
National Transportation Safety Committee NTSC Indonesia 
Marine Accident Investigation Department  DIAM Panama 
Philippine Coast Guard PCG Philippines 
Safety Investigation Authority SIA Finland 
Swedish Accident Investigation Board  SHK Sweden 
Swedish Transport Agency STA Sweden 
The Nautical Institute MARS United Kingdom 
Transport Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau TAIIB Latvia 
Transport Accident Investigation Commission TAIC New Zealand 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada TSB Canada 
United States Coast Guard (Homeport) USCG USA 








Table 2.The frequency and degree of importance (%) of the factors causing collision 
accidents 
HFACS-PV Model for Collision Accidents f % 
1. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 103 19,92 
a- Internal 
Environment 
Non-conformities and failures preventing ship's motion 14 2,71 
b- External 
Environment 
i- Weather Conditions 
Impairing Visibility 14 2,71 
Preventing Vessel’s Motion 16 3,09 
ii- Local Restrictions 59 11,41 
 External Environment  Total 89 17,21 
2. ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES 58 11,21 
a- Resource 
Management 
i- Human Resources 
Training&Famil
iarization 
Navigation Area 4 0,77 
Vessel 12 2,32 
Crew Assignment 4 0,77 
ii- Equipment & Facility 
Resources 
Insufficient Equipment 4 0,77 
Inappropriate Equipments - - 
Ergonomic Design Flaws 9 1,74 





Communication&Coordination - - 
Chain of Command - - 
Distribution of Authority - - 
ii- Policies 
Promotion - - 
Drug& Alcohol - - 
iii- Organizational Culture - - 
Organizational ClimateTotal   
c- Organizational 
Process 
i- Operation Management 2 0,39 
ii- Legal Shortcomings 
Procedure Based 6 1,16 
Legislation Based 2 0,39 
iii- Oversight 
Risk Management 4 0,77 
Safety Assessment 11 2,13 
Organizational Process Total 25 4,84 
3. UNSAFE SUPERVISION 18 3,48 
a- Insufficient Supervision 6 1,16 
b- Planned Inappropriate Operations 12 2,32 
c- Failure to Correct a Known Problem - - 
 
4. PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS 157 30,37 








i- Adverse Mental Conditions 39 7,54 
ii- Adverse Physical Conditions 3 0,58 
iii- Physical and Mental Limitations 41 7,93 









Inappropriate Management Activities 15 2,90 
Lack of Communication 22 4,26 
Lack of Coordination 24 4,64 
Substandard Practices of Team Members Total 72 13,93 
5. UNSAFE ACTS 181 35,01 
a- Errors 
i- Skill Based Errors 31 6,00 
ii-  Decision Based Errors 31 6,00 
iii- Perceptual Errors 29 5,61 
Errors Total 91 17,61 
b- Violations 
i- Regulation Violations 76 14,70 
ii-  Procedure Violations 13 2,51 
iii- Abuse of Authority 1 0,19 
Violations Total 90 17,40 
